In criminal trial charges framed on same date of appointment of counsel- effective representation is not possible - conviction set aside by SC.

Supreme Court of India

Justice Uday Umesh Lalit, Justice Indu Malhotra and Justice Krishna Murari

The SC {ANOKHILAL v. STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH} holds following principles, of law, in cases of right to legal representation of accused:-

"a) Article 39-A inserted by the 42nd amendment to the Constitution, effected in the year 1977, provides for free legal aid to ensure that opportunities for securing justice are not denied to any citizen by reason of economic or other disabilities. The statutory regime put in place including the enactment of the Legal Services Authorities Act, 1987 is designed to achieve the mandate of Article 39-A.

b) It has been well accepted that Right to Free Legal Services is an essential ingredient of ‘reasonable, fair and just’ procedure for a person accused of an offence and it must be held implicit in the right guaranteed by Article 21. The extract from the decision of this Court in Best Bakery case (as quoted in the decision in Mohd. Hussain ) emphasizes that the object of criminal trial is to search for the truth and the trial is not a bout over technicalities and must be conducted in such manner as will protect the innocent and punish the guilty.

c) Even before insertion of Article 39-A in the Constitution, the decision of this Court in Bashira put the matter beyond any doubt and held that the time granted to the Amicus Curiae in that matter to prepare for the defense was completely insufficient and that the award of sentence of death resulted in deprivation of the life of the accused and was in breach of the procedure established by law.

d) The portion quoted in Bashira from the judgment of the Madras High Court authored by Subba Rao, J., the then Chief Justice of the High Court, stated with clarity that mere formal compliance of the rule under which sufficient time had to be given to the counsel to prepare for the defense would not carry out the object underlying the rule. It was further stated that the opportunity must be real where the counsel is given sufficient and adequate time to prepare. 

e) In Bashira as well as in Ambadas, making substantial progress in the matter on the very day after a counsel was engaged as Amicus Curiae, was not accepted by this Court as compliance of ‘sufficient opportunity’ to the counsel."

In the present case, the Amicus Curiae, was appointed on 19.02.2013, and on the same date, the counsel was called upon to defend the accused at the stage of framing of charges. It was held that one can say with certainty that the Amicus Curiae did not have sufficient time to go through even the basic documents, nor the advantage of any discussion or interaction with the accused, and time to reflect over the matter. Thus, even before the Amicus Curiae could come to grips of the matter, the charges were framed.

It was held that the Trial Court on its own, ought to have adjourned the matter for some time so that the Amicus Curiae could have had the advantage of sufficient time to prepare the matter. The approach adopted by the Trial Court, may have expedited the conduct of trial, but did not further the cause of justice. Not only were the charges framed the same day as stated above, but the trial itself was concluded within a fortnight thereafter. In the process, the assistance that the appellant was entitled to in the form of legal aid, could not be real and meaningful.

Further held that expeditious disposal is undoubtedly required in criminal matters and that would naturally be part of guarantee of fair trial. However, the attempts to expedite the process should not be at the expense of the basic elements of fairness and the opportunity to the accused, on which postulates, the entire criminal administration of justice is founded. In the pursuit for expeditious disposal, the cause of justice must never be allowed to suffer or be sacrificed. What is paramount is the cause of justice and keeping the basic ingredients which secure that as a core idea and ideal, the process may be expedited, but fast tracking of process must never ever result in burying the cause of justice.

The SC, therefore, went on in setting aside the judgments of conviction and orders of sentence passed by the Trial Court and the High Court against the appellant and directed de novo consideration of the matter by the trial court.