The SC on Aug 13, 2021 {Kaptan Singh vs. The State of Uttar Pradesh and others} held that exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the proceedings is an exception and not a rule.
It was held by the Bench, comprising of Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud & Justice M.R. Shah that the High Court has failed to appreciate and consider the fact that there are very serious triable issues/allegations which are required to be gone into and considered at the time of trial. It was held that the High Court has lost sight of crucial aspects which have emerged during the course of the investigation.
The SC observed that it is required to be noted that when the High Court in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. quashed the criminal proceedings, by the time the Investigating Officer after recording the statement of the witnesses, statement of the complainant and collecting the evidence from the incident place and after taking statement of the independent witnesses and even statement of the accused persons, has filed the charge-sheet before the Learned Magistrate for the offences under Sections 147, 148, 149, 406, 329 and 386 of IPC and even the learned Magistrate also took the cognizance. It was held that from the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court, it does not appear that the High Court took into consideration the material collected during the investigation/inquiry and even the statements recorded.
It was held that if the petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was at the stage of FIR in that case the allegations in the FIR/Complaint only are required to be considered and whether a cognizable offence is disclosed or not is required to be considered. It was further held that, thereafter when the statements are recorded, evidence is collected and the charge-sheet is filed after conclusion of the investigation/inquiry the matter stands on different footing and the Court is required to consider the material/evidence collected during the investigation. It was held that even at this stage also, the High Court is not required to go into the merits of the allegations and/or enter into the merits of the case as if the High Court is exercising the appellate jurisdiction and/or conducting the trial.
The SC held that when the payment of Rs.25 lakhs as mentioned in the joint notarized affidavit is seriously disputed and even one of the cheques out of 5 cheques each of Rs. 2 lakhs was dishonoured and according to the accused they were handed over the possession (which is seriously disputed) it can be said to be entrustment of property. Therefore, it was held that at this stage to opine that no case is made out for the offence under Section 406 IPC is premature and the aforesaid aspect is to be considered during trial.
In view of the above, the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court quashing the criminal proceedings in exercise of powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. was set aside and was accordingly quashed by the SC. The present appeal was accordingly allowed.
]]>The SC on August 10, 2021 {Parubai vs. The State of Maharashtra} observed that the High Court has held the appellant guilty more on preponderance of probability rather than reaching a conclusion beyond reasonable doubt. Though it has employed the phrase ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ in its concluding paragraph, the reasoning preceding the same are only conjectures and surmises.
It was also held by the Bench, comprising of Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice Hemant Gupta that even if the chemical analysis report referring to the frock is accepted there is nothing on record to connect that the appellant was responsible for the sprinkling of the kerosene or for the kerosene to have come in contact with the frock of Nikita which is said to have been recovered from the place of occurrence. Therefore, it was held that the circumstance that the appellant was not injured in the incident cannot be the basis to rely on the presence of kerosene stains on the frock as a circumstance that she had set fire by sprinkling kerosene.
Further the SC held that mere suspicion would not be sufficient, unless the circumstantial evidence tendered by the prosecution leads to the conclusion that it “must be true” and not “may be true”. In that backdrop, it was held that a perusal of the judgment passed by the Session’s Court as well as the High Court in the instant case, for its ultimate conclusion has made suspicion the reason for rendering conviction without there being any strong basis. It was held that the suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof.
It was held that if in the middle of the night for whatever reason there was fire and if the appellant had woken up and noticed it a little earlier, the natural conduct is to run out of the house instead of going into the house which is burning to check on the other inmates. It was held that it takes a person lot of courage or be overdriven with compassion to get back into the house to save somebody else and not doing so may be considered as morally wrong for not coming to the aid of fellow human being in distress, but it cannot be a circumstance to hold a person guilty of a crime which is as serious as murder unless the other circumstances in the chain point to the accused so as to lead to an irresistible conclusion of being guilty.
It was held that if the appellant was responsible for causing the fire with the intention to kill Mandabai, would not she have closed the door after coming out of the house to ensure that she does not come out. It was held that the High Court holding the appellant guilty of pouring kerosene around the deceased and her children and setting them on fire since the appellant had failed to explain the reason for eruption of fire in view of such obligation to explain under Section 106 is also not sustainable in the present circumstance. In the instant case, it was held since the other circumstances in the chain are not established, the same cannot be held against the appellant. It was held on the other hand, the case itself is that the fire had erupted at midnight when the appellant and others were sleeping and she come out shouting. It was held that the explanation for the cause of fire by the appellant would have arisen only if there was any other evidence to the effect that the appellant was already awake and was outside even before the fire erupted.
In the result, the judgment dated 12.10.2017 passed by the High Court affirming the conviction and sentence ordered by the Sessions Court were set aside. The appellant Parubai who was on interim bail was set at liberty and her bail bond stood discharged. The appeal was, accordingly, allowed by the SC.
]]>The SC on July 26, 2021 {M/s Supreme Bhiwandi Wada Manor Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. vs. The State of Maharashtra & Anr.} held that Section 156 Cr.PC. primarily deals with the powers of the police officer to investigate cognizable cases. It was held that while passing an order under Section 156(3), the Magistrate does not take cognizance as the order of the Magistrate is in the nature of ―a pre-emptory reminder or intimation to the police to exercise their primary duty and power of investigation. It was held that the power of the Magistrate under Section 156(3) is not affected by the provisions of Section 202.
It was held by the Bench, comprising of Justice Dr. Dhananjaya Y. Chandrachud & Justice M.R. Shah that an appellate court or a superior court can set aside the order granting bail if the court granting bail did not consider relevant factors.
It was further held that there are serious allegations against the respondent – accused of a fraudulent misappropriation of amounts intended to be paid by the company to the farmers affected by the work of road widening being undertaken by the complainant. It was held that the FIR sets out details of the alleged acts of fraud and misappropriation of funds. It was held having regard to the seriousness of the allegations no case for anticipatory bail was made out. It was held that the High Court has erred both in law and in its evaluation of the facts.
The SC accordingly allowed these appeals and set aside the orders of the High Court. The orders granting anticipatory bail under Section 438 to the respondent/accused were accordingly stood set aside. The appeals were allowed by the SC.
]]>The SC on July 20, 2021 {A P MAHESH COOPERATIVE URBAN BANK SHAREHOLDERS WELFARE ASSOCIATION VS. RAMESH KUMAR BUNG AND ORS.} held that it was patently an election dispute which was sought to be converted to a criminal case. It was held that more often than not election disputes are fought on different turfs, such as polling booths, police stations and court rooms. It was held that sometimes, persons who raise these disputes manage to camouflage their real motive by words clothed in high moral fiber and strong legal content. It was further held but unfortunately, the petitioner could not do it successfully in this case, as the election disputes came to the court first before the petitioner could fall back upon allegations of loan fraud and fortunately, the High Court saw through the game. It was held that this is why the High Court in its impugned order, granted the extraordinary relief of stay of further proceedings including the arrest of Respondents 1 to 3 herein. It was held that the facts are so glaring and the background setting so shocking, that the High Court correctly found it to be a fit and proper case to grant interim reliefs to Respondents 13 herein.
It was held by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice Indira Banerjee & Justice V. Ramasubramanian, that in the order impugned in these petitions, the High Court has given elaborate reasons as to how the allegations of bank fraud were developed during the proceedings concerning allegations of election fraud. Therefore, the impugned order cannot be said to be bad.
In present case, Challenging an order passed by the High Court for the State of Telangana in two interlocutory applications granting stay of all further proceedings including the arrest of the Respondents 1 to 3 herein (petitioners before the High Court), pending two main petitions for quashing the criminal complaints, the de facto complainant, has come up with these Special Leave Petitions before the SC.
The SC held that it is of the considered view that the High Court was perfectly justified in granting interim protection to the Respondents 1 to 3 herein and in ensuring that the supremacy of the ballot is not sabotaged by the authority of the police. Hence the SLPs were dismissed by the SC. Consequently the applications for stay were dismissed and the stay earlier granted was vacated by the SC.
]]>The SC on July 12, 2021 {Mamta Nair vs. State of Rajasthan & Anr.} held that the documents already taken note by this Court in earlier appeal indicates that there is prima facie material against the respondent No. 2. It was held though subsequently the appellant herein, i.e., the wife of the deceased has been examined and a contention has been put forth with regard to her statement, it is not the evidence in its entirety and it is premature to conclude on the basis of a stray sentence.
It was also held by the Bench, comprising of Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice A.S. Bopanna and Justice Hrishikesh Roy that merely classifying the appellant as the principal star witness and referring to her statement is of no consequence since the entire evidence will have to be assessed by the Sessions Court before arriving at a conclusion. It was held that if that be the position when this Court at an earlier instance had taken note of all aspects and had arrived at the conclusion that there is prima facie material against the respondent No. 2, the mere examination of the appellant herein cannot be considered as a change in circumstance for the High Court to consider the fourth bail application of the respondent No. 2 and enlarge him on bail.
In the instant appeal before the SC, the wife of the deceased assailed the order dated 01.12.2020 passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench whereunder the respondent No. 2 has been ordered to be enlarged on bail. Whereas in an earlier instance the Supreme Court while disposing of an earlier Criminal Appeal No. 780 of 2018 relating to the same incident had cancelled the bail, and thereafter the statement of witnesses has been recorded - which formed the basis before HC to grant bail.
In the above background, the SC held that the order dated 01.12.2020 granting bail passed by the High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan, Bench at Jaipur, was not sustainable. The same was accordingly set aside and the bail granted to respondent No. 2 was cancelled by the SC. The appeal was accordingly allowed.
]]>The SC on July 6, 2021 {Rakesh and another vs. State of U.P. and another} held that having gone through the entire depositions of PW1 & PW2 and even the cross examination of the aforesaid two witnesses, it is of the firm opinion that both, PW1 & PW2 are trustworthy and reliable witnesses. It was held that there may be some minor contradictions, however, as held by the Court in catena of decisions earlier, minor contradictions which do not go to the root of the matter and/or such contradictions are not material contradictions, the evidence of such witnesses cannot be brushed aside and/or disbelieved.
It was also observed by the Bench, comprising of Justice M.R. Shah and Justice D.Y. Chandrachud that now so far as the submission on behalf of the accused that as per the ballistic report the bullet found did not match with the gun recovered, it is submitted by the prosecution that as held by this Court in the case of Himanshu Mohan Rai v. State of U.P., (2017) 4 SCC 161, in a case where the ballistic report is contrary to the evidence of the witnesses, but the statements of the witnesses have inspired the confidence of the Court and have been held to be credible and reliable, then such a contradiction between the ballistic report and the credible evidence of a witness cannot be the basis of rejecting the evidence of a witness.
Therefore, the SC held that at the most, it can be said that the gun recovered by the police from the accused may not have been used for killing and therefore the recovery of the actual weapon used for killing can be ignored and it is to be treated as if there is no recovery at all. It was further held that for convicting an accused recovery of the weapon used in commission of offence is not a sine qua non. It was held that it is not possible to reject the credible ocular evidence of PW1 & PW2 – eye witnesses who witnessed the shooting. It was held that it has no bearing on credibility of deposition of PW1 & PW2 that A1 shot deceased with a gun, particularly as it is corroborated by bullet in the body and also stands corroborated by the testimony of PW2 & PW5. Therefore, it was held that merely because the ballistic report shows that the bullet recovered does not match with the gun recovered, it is not possible to reject the credible and reliable deposition of PW1 & PW2.
The Court further held that now so far as the submission on behalf of the defence that PW2 stated that he reached the spot subsequently after he received the message is concerned, what is required to appreciate and consider the evidence as a whole. It was held that when a specific question was asked to him that in the statement before the police, he stated that he reached subsequently, PW2 has specifically denied the same and he has categorically stated that no such statement was given by him to the police and he does not know how such a statement was recorded in his statement. It was held that no question has been asked by the defence to the person/IO who recorded the statement of PW2. It was held that considering the entire deposition as a whole, it is of the opinion that the prosecution has been successful in proving the presence of PW1 & PW2 at the time and place of incident. It was held that they are found to be trustworthy and reliable.
In view of the above and for the reasons stated above, the SC held that no interference of this Court is called for. It was further held that the learned trial Court and the High Court have rightly convicted the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 r/w 34 of the IPC. Under the circumstances, the appeal failed and was accordingly dismissed by the SC.
]]>The Delhi HC on June 28, 2021 {SUNIL TYAGI vs GOVT OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR} held that the Investigating Officer may apply to a Magistrate for issuance of warrant of arrest where the offence is cognizable, non-bailable and the accused/suspect is evading his arrest. It was held that before applying for warrant, the Investigating Officer shall show the efforts made to arrest the accused.
The Single Judge of Delhi High Court, Justice J.R. Midha, further held that no warrant shall be issued against an accused merely on the ground that he is not available to the Investigating Officer/Police for joining the investigation. It was also held that the police shall file an affidavit disclosing the date, time and mode of service as well as the attempts made to search and identify the accused.
NBW DURING TRIAL
The Delhi HC held that at the stage of trial, the accused is normally on bail. It was held that the abscondance during trial is more serious than abscondance during investigation as the accused has already crossed the stage of investigation and has been summoned by the Court to face trial and if the Charge(s) has/have been framed, the finding of existence of prima facie case against the accused is on record. It was held that mere non-appearance of accused without any justified reasons is sufficient justification for issuance of warrants of arrest including NBW by the Court.
Guidelines for cases instituted on private criminal complaints
The HC directed that the complainant shall share all available addresses of the accused known to him i.e. current/temporary/ permanent and workplace. It was directed that the complainant shall file documentary proof of the address of the accused, if available. It was further directed that post entering of appearance by the accused, the accused shall disclose additional addresses other than those mentioned in complaint to the Court with address proof. It was also directed that in complaint cases, accused shall furnish name, address, relation and other details of his three relatives for future communication, and the photograph and the identity proof of the accused and surety to be affixed on the bail bond.
Guidelines for conditions to be imposed at the time of granting bail
At the time of grant of bail, it was directed by the HC that the Court shall direct the accused to (i) disclose the address where they ordinarily reside or any other address, (ii) share a copy of their Government ID proofs such as Aadhar, PAN Card, driving license, Voter ID, Ration card etc. It was also directed that the accused shall furnish the relevant information relating to his residential/permanent address, details of his family, contact details including telephone/mobile numbers/email etc. in the format of Annexure B (as per judgment) to the court at the time of grant of bail in addition to Form 45 CrPC.
Guidelines for Issuance of Proclamation
The Delhi HC directed that the police has to submit a report before the Court that the person against whom the warrant was issued, has absconded or is concealing himself. It was held that mere non-availability at the address is not sufficient unless the concealment is deliberate to avoid arrest. It was also held that a person who had gone abroad before the issue of the warrant of arrest cannot be said to be absconding or concealing. However, it was held that if the accused left India before proclamation but continues to remain outside India with a view to defeat or delay the execution of the warrant, he shall be taken to be absconding.
The Delhi HC directed that the police officer shall file an affidavit/status report to disclose the addresses and phone numbers/email addresses (if available) of the accused against whom the warrants had been issued and the reasons for inability to secure the presence of the accused before the Court.
Pre-requisites to the issuance of a proclamation
The Delhi HC directed that prior to issuance of a proclamation under Section 82(1) CrPC,
(i) The police officer may file an Affidavit/Status Report disclosing:
(a) All available addresses and phone numbers/email addresses (if available) of the person against whom the warrant has been issued along with proof of the said addresses, phone numbers/email addresses and any other details available in the information sheet with underlying documents demonstrating the same;
b) particulars of proof of service of the arrest warrant at the said address (i) by post; (ii) by hand (iii)mobile number, (iv) email address (if any) and (v) service on a family member/neighbor along with credible proof of the same;
c) In the event warrant has been affixed on a conspicuous part of the house where the person ordinarily resides, town/village/ courthouse, the police officer must annex a picture showing that warrant has been affixed in such manner along with his affidavit. The picture must be taken in a manner that makes it clear to the Court that the warrant has in fact, been affixed at the said house;
(d) Reasons for inability of the police officer in securing presence of the person against whom warrant is issued;
(ii) The Court must pass an order dealing with the contents of the Affidavit/Status Report and reasons given by the police officer for arriving at a conclusion that the person has absconded or is concealing‟ himself or reasons for inability of the officer in securing presence of the person.
The HC further held that before issuing a proclamation, the Court shall examine the officer with respect to the measures taken by him to execute the warrants. It was held that issuance of an arrest warrant and the accused found absconding, are pre-conditions for issuing proclamation. It was also held that simultaneous issuance of both the processes, namely, warrant of arrest and proclamation is ex-facie contradictory, since it is only after the former that the latter can be issued where the concerned person has absconded or is hiding.
The Delhi HC further held that prior to publication under Section 82(2)(ii) CrPC the Police Officer may be mandatorily required to file an Affidavit disclosing: A picture showing that proclamation has been affixed in a conspicuous place of the house where the person resides. It was held that the picture must be taken in a manner that makes it clear to the Court that the proclamation has in fact, been affixed at the said house; The Court must pass an order dealing with the contents of the Affidavit and statement of the process server along with its reasons for directing publication under Section 82(2)(ii).
It was also held that publication by all three modes namely (i) public reading in some conspicuous place of the town/village in such person ordinarily resides; (ii) affixation at some conspicuous part of the house or homestead and (iii) affixation at some conspicuous part of the court house are mandatory under Section 82(2) CrPC. It was held that the failure to comply with all the three modes of publication is to be considered invalid publication, according to law as the three sub-clauses (a) to (c) are conjunctive and not disjunctive.
It was further held that the three clauses (a), (b) and (c) of Section 82(2)(i) CrPC are conjunctive and not disjunctive. It was held that the factum of valid publication depends on the satisfaction of each of these clauses. Clause (ii) of sub-Section (2) is optional; it is not an alternative to clause (i). It was held that the latter clause is mandatory.
It was held that prior to the publication under Section 82(2)(i) CrPC, the police shall file an affidavit along with the photographs of the affixation of proclamation on the conspicuous part of the resident of the accused. It was directed that the police officer shall fill and submit performa in the format of Annexure C (as per judgment) before the court at the stage of seeking proclamation.
Guidelines for Enhancing the Efficiency in Execution of Proclamations
It was also directed that execution of Section 82/83 CrPC processes to be done by an officer not below the rank of S.I., since it is now a cognizable offence, under 174A IPC – Since abscondance and declaration as a Proclaimed Person/Offender has now become a cognizable and non-bailable offence, it is imperative that the execution of Sections 82 and 83 CrPC is done by an officer not below the rank of SubInspector. It was directed that the names, addresses and pictures of the Proclaimed Persons/Offenders be made public on different government websites i.e. Delhi Police, NCRB, CBI and other States Police. It was directed that the data of the Proclaimed Persons/Offenders in cases involving the Delhi Police, as is already available on ZIPNET, should be made accessible to the public. It was also directed that details of Proclaimed Persons/Offenders be also published on the website of the District Courts.
It was held that steps should be initiated for impounding or revocation of passport of the Proclaimed Person/Offender. It was held that in the absence of impounding or revocation of passports, the Proclaimed Person/Offender would be at liberty to travel freely in international jurisdictions. It was observed that taking expeditious steps in this regard shall be a key step in curtailing scope for international movements of Proclaimed Person/Offender.
It was held that the Court, after declaring the person as a Proclaimed Person/Offender, shall direct the Police to trace and identify the movable and immovable properties of the Proclaimed Person/Offender and file the status report with respect to the assets of the Proclaimed Person/Offender. It was directed that the Court shall thereafter proceed to attach the movable and immovable properties of the Proclaimed Person/Offender in accordance with the law.
It was held that after the declaration of a person as a Proclaimed Person/Offender, the Police is required to trace the Proclaimed Person/Offender and arrest him. It was directed by the HC that the Court declaring a person as a Proclaimed Person/Offender shall direct the Police to take all necessary action for tracing the Proclaimed Person/Offender and file the Status Report with respect to the action taken by the Police.
It was held that in all cases in which an accused is absconding, except those of exceedingly trivial or petty nature or where special circumstances exist which make the procedure unnecessary or undesirable, the Court may consider recording evidence against the absconded offender under section 299 CrPC. It was further held that in order to render evidence recorded under section 299 CrPC admissible at future trial, it must be proved and put on record that the offender has absconded and that there is no immediate prospect of arresting him.
All the Courts below were directed by the Delhi HC not to close the matter after declaring a person as a Proclaimed Person/Offender. Rather, it was directed that the Concerned Courts shall direct the police to file the Status Report with respect to the efforts made to trace the Proclaimed Persons/Offenders; efforts made to trace or attach their movable/ immovable assets/properties and their prosecution in accordance with law. It was directed that the concerned Courts shall monitor the action taken by the Police and shall issue such fresh directions as may be considered necessary. It was also directed that the Court may, in appropriate cases, record the evidence of the witnesses under Section 299 CrPC.
The Delhi HC further held that in cases where some of the accused are absconding and some are facing trial in the Court the evidence should first be produced to prove that these persons are absconding and that there was no immediate prospect of arresting them. It was held that the evidence of the witnesses should thereafter be recorded in the case against those present. It was held that such evidence would be relevant against the absconders under section 299 CrPC, according to which on the arrest of the absconding accused, the deposition of the witnesses recorded in his absence may be given in evidence against him if the deponent is dead or incapable of giving evidence or cannot be found or his presence cannot be procured without an amount of delay or inconvenience which, under the circumstances of the case would be unreasonable. It was also held that the last ground can easily be cited where a large number of prosecution witnesses have been examined in the absence of the absconding accused.
With the aforesaid directions and observations, dealing comprehensively with Sec 82/ 83 Cr.P.C. proceedings, the petitions were disposed of by the HC.
]]>The SC on June 30, 2021 {SURENDRAN vs. SUB-INSPECTOR OF POLICE} held that it does not find any error in conviction recorded by the Trial Court. It was held that the conviction of appellant is affirmed, however, looking to the facts and circumstances of the present case specially the fact that 26 years have elapsed from the incident, it is inclined to substitute the sentence of six months imprisonment under Section 279 and 338 into fine. It was held that six months sentence under Section 279 and 338 IPC are substituted by fine of Rs.1000/- each whereas sentence of fine under Section 337 IPC is maintained.
It was also observed by the Bench, comprising of Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice Vineet Saran and Justice M.R. Shah that the incident took place on 16.02.1995 i.e. more than 26 years ago and the appellant was throughout on the bail.
In the present case, the Trial Court after marshalling the evidence has recorded the conviction under Section 279, 338 and awarded sentence of imprisonment of six months and further sentenced to pay a fine of Rs.500/- under Section 337. The appeal before the SC has been filed against the judgment of the High Court dated 01.09.2015 dismissing the Criminal Revision filed by the appellant challenging his conviction and sentence under Section 279, 337 and 338 IPC.
Before the SC, the appellant contended that the appellant is sole bread earning member of a poor family consisting of four children and his wife, and the appellant if sent to jail after more than 21 years, will suffer irreparable injury. The appellant had placed reliance on earlier judgments of the Supreme Court in A.P. Raju versus State of Orissa, 1995 Supp.(2) SCC 385 and Prakash Chandra Agnihotri versus State of M.P., (1990) Supp. SCC 764.
It was held by the SC that the judgment of the Court in Prakash Chandra Agnihotri (Supra) as relied by learned counsel for the appellant does support his submissions. In the above earlier case, the accused was convicted and sentenced for six months under Section 304A. The Supreme Court in that case also converted the sentence of imprisonment into fine of Rs.500/-. It was held in the earlier case too by the Supreme Court that it would be harsh to send the appellant to the Jail after 18 years of the occurrence.
Accordingly, the judgments of the Courts below were modified to the above extent. The appeal was partly allowed by the SC.
]]>The SC on June 03, 2021 {VINOD DUA vs. UNION OF INDIA & ORS.} held that the practice of directing that the High Court be approached first even in cases of violation of fundamental rights, is more of a self imposed discipline by this Court; but in glaring cases of deprivation of liberty, this Court has entertained petitions under Article 32 of the Constitution.
It was also held by the Bench, comprising of Justice Uday Umesh Lalit and Justice Vineet Saran that under Sections 124-A and 505 of the IPC, according to the Court only such activities which would be intended or have a tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence – are rendered penal. It was held that apart from the fact that the right claimed by the petitioner is one under Article 19 (1) (a) of the Constitution of India and the second prayer made by the petitioner can effectively be considered only in a writ petition. It was held that going by the nature of the second prayer, relegating the petitioner to file a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, may not be appropriate. Rather, the issue must ideally be settled by this Court.
It was held by the SC that a citizen has a right to criticize or comment upon the measures undertaken by the Government and its functionaries, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder; and that it is only when the words or expressions have pernicious tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of law and order that Sections 124A and 505 of the IPC must step in.
The SC held that the statements by the petitioner, if read in the light of the principles emanating from the decision in Kedar Nath Singh vs. State of Bihar, (1962) Supp. 2 SCR 769 and against the backdrop of the circumstances when they were made, can at best be termed as expression of disapprobation of actions of the Government and its functionaries so that prevailing situation could be addressed quickly and efficiently. It was held that they were certainly not made with the intent to incite people or showed tendency to create disorder or disturbance of public peace by resort to violence. It was held that the petitioner was within the permissible limits laid down in the decision of this Court in Kedar Nath Singh (Supra). It was also held that it may be that certain factual details in the 3rd statement regarding the date when the ban came into effect were not completely correct. However, considering the drift of the entire talk show and all the statements put together it cannot be said that the petitioner crossed the limits set out in the decision of this Court in Kedar Nath Singh (Supra).
It was held that, therefore, the SC is of the firm view that the prosecution of the petitioner for the offences punishable under Sections 124A and 505 (1) (b) of the IPC would be unjust. Those offences, going by the allegations in the FIR and other attending circumstances, are not made out at all and any prosecution in respect thereof would be violative of the rights of the petitioner guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution.Thus, it was held that all the offences set out in the FIR are not made out at all.
In Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab and Another, (2005) 6 SCC 1, the SC earlier held:
"......A private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence before the court in the form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused doctor. The investigating officer should, before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or negligent act or omission, obtain an independent and competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in government service, qualified in that branch of medical practice who can normally be expected to give an impartial and unbiased opinion applying the Bolam test to the facts collected in the investigation..."
In Jacob Mathew (Supra), the guidelines were issued by the SC after noticing Section 88 of the IPC falling in Chapter titled “General Exceptions” as well as illustrations below Sections 88, 92, and 93 of the IPC. It was held by the SC that the direction, “a private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence before the Court in the form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to support the charge of rashness and negligence on the part of the accused doctor” was founded on reasons including the status of a medical professional acknowledged by Section 88 and that the investigating officers and the private complainant would not be supposed to be having knowledge about medical science so as to determine whether the act of the accused professional amounted to a rash and negligent act.
The SC held that second prayer made in the Writ Petition is asking for the constitution of the Committee completely outside the scope of the statutory framework. It was held that such exercise of directing constitution of a Committee was found inconsistent with the statutory framework in the subsequent decisions of three Judge Bench of this Court in Union of India vs. State of Maharashtra and Others, (2020) 4 SCC 761 and in Social Action Forum for manav Adhikar and Another vs. Union of India, Ministry of Law and Justice and Others, (2018) 10 SCC 443. It was therefore held by the SC that any relief granted in terms of second prayer in present Writ Petition would certainly amount to encroachment upon the field reserved for the legislature.
The SC, therefore, quashed FIR No.0053 dated 6.5.2020, registered at Police Station Kumarsain, Distt. Shimla, Himachal Pradesh, against the petitioner. But rejected the prayer that no FIR be registered against a person belonging to media with at least 10 years of standing unless cleared by the Committee.
]]>The Delhi HC on June 15, 2021 {ASIF IQBAL TANHA vs STATE OF NCT OF DELHI & ANR.} held that notwithstanding the fact that the definition of ‘terrorist act’ in section 15 UAPA is wide and even somewhat vague, the phrase must partake of the essential character of terrorism and the phrase ‘terrorist act’ cannot be permitted to be casually applied to criminal acts or omissions that fall squarely within the definition of conventional offences as defined inter alia under the IPC.
The Division Bench of Delhi High Court comprising, Justice SIDDHARTH MRIDUL & Justice ANUP JAIRAM BHAMBHANI, further held that when law visits a person with serious penal consequences, the courts must take extra care to ensure that those to whom the legislature did not intend to be covered by the express language of the statute “are not roped in by stretching the law”.
The HC also held that another sacrosanct principle of interpretation of penal provisions is that they must be construed strictly and narrowly, to ensure that a person who was not within the legislative intendment does not get roped into a penal provision. Also, the more stringent a penal provision, the more strictly it must be construed.
It was held by the DB of Delhi HC that the intent and purport of the Parliament in enacting the UAPA, and more specifically in amending it in 2004 and 2008 to bring terrorist activity within its scope, was, and could only have had been, to deal with matters of profound impact on the ‘Defence of India’, nothing more and nothing less. It was held that absent this, UAPA could not have been enacted by the Parliament since the only entries in List-I of the Seventh Schedule to the Constitution that would bring the statute within the legislative competence of the Parliament are Entry 1 read with Entry 93 relating to the Defence of India and offences with respect to the Defence of India. It was held that it was neither the intent nor purport of enacting UAPA that other offences of the usual and ordinary kind, however grave, egregious or heinous in their nature and extent, should also be covered by UAPA, since such conventional matters would have fallen within Entry 1 of List-II (State List) and/or Entry 1 of List-III (Concurrent List) of the Seventh Schedule to our Constitution. It was further held that in order to lean in favour of constitutionality of the provisions of section 15, 17 and 18 of the UAPA, as the court must, it must be taken that the Parliament acted within the realm of its legislative competence and that UAPA came to be enacted and amended in 2004 and 2008 to address issues relating to the ‘Defence of India’.
In the present case, the appellant was in judicial custody, having been arrested on 19.05.2020 in case FIR No. 59/2020 dated 06.03.2020 registered under sections 147 / 148 / 149 / 120B Indian Penal Code 1860 (‘IPC’, for short) at P.S.: Crime Branch (‘subject FIR’, for short) in connection with the incidents of violence and rioting that occurred in North-East Delhi between 22.02.2020 and 26.02.2020. It may be noted that offences under sections 109 / 114 / 124A / 153A / 186 / 201 / 212 / 295 / 302 / 307 / 341 /353 / 395 / 419 / 420 / 427 / 435 / 436 / 452 / 454 / 468 / 471 / 34 IPC, sections 3 / 4 of the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act, 1984 (‘PDPP Act’, for short), sections 25 / 26 of Arms Act, 1959 and sections 13 / 16 / 17 / 18 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 (‘UAPA’, for short) were subsequently added to the subject FIR. The appellant in present appeal impugned order dated 26.10.2020 made by the learned Special Court before the HC, whereby the appellant’s second application seeking enlargement on bail has been rejected.
The HC held that essential aim and intent of the activities, in which the appellant is alleged to have been involved, was to orchestrate and participate in a protest across the city of Delhi to oppose the enactment of the CAA, which was perceived as a law intended to deprive members of the Muslim community of citizenship of the Republic of India. It was held that there is no allegation in the subject charge-sheet that the anti-CAA protest extended even to the whole of the National Capital Territory of Delhi; and a perusal of the subject charge-sheet shows that the protest and the disruptions it is alleged to have caused were restricted to North-East Delhi. It was held that it would therefore be a stretch to say that the protest affected the community at large for it to qualify as an act of terror.
The court held that having given its anxious consideration to this aspect of ‘likelihood’ of threat and terror, it is of the view that the foundations of our nation stand on surer footing than to be likely to be shaken by a protest, however vicious, organised by a tribe of college students or other persons, operating as a coordination committee from the confines of a University situate in the heart of Delhi.
It was held that it has been a recurrent theme, repeatedly urged by the State, that what was contemplated and in fact brought to fruition was not a typical protest but an aggravated protest which was intended to disrupt the life of the community in Delhi. It was held that the court find itself unpersuaded and unconvinced with this submission since it is not founded on any specific factual allegation and it is of the view that the mere use of alarming and hyperbolic verbiage in the subject charge-sheet will not convince the court otherwise. It was held that in this case, it finds that the State’s attempt to show that the accusations made against the appellant are prima facie true, does not commend itself for acceptance.
The HC held that one has to imagine three concentric circles. Law and order represents the largest circle within which is the next circle representing public order and the smallest circle represents security of State. It was held it is smallest circle which encompasses offences which are very serious in nature. It was held that the acts become more and more grave as we journey from the periphery of the largest circle towards the centre. In this journey we travel first through public tranquillity, then through public order and lastly to the security of the State.
It was held that the extent and reach of terrorist activity must travel beyond the effect of an ordinary crime and must not arise merely by causing disturbance of law and order or even public order; and must be such that it travels beyond the capacity of the ordinary law enforcement agencies to deal with it under the ordinary penal law. It was held that terrorism is generally an attempt to acquire or maintain power or control by intimidation and causing fear and helplessness in the minds of the people at large or any section thereof and is a totally abnormal phenomenon.
It was held by the HC that that there are no reasonable grounds for believing that the accusations against the appellant are prima facie true, the Proviso to section 43D(5) would not apply; and the court must therefore fall back upon the general principles of grant or denial of bail to an accused person charged with certain offences.
It was held that upon a conspectus of the general law relating to bail and applying these well-worn principles to the present case, in the court's view, though during trial the State will no doubt attempt to marshal evidence and make good the allegations made against the appellant, as it speaks now these are mere allegations and as the court is not convinced prima facie of the veracity of the allegations so made. It was further held that Charge-sheet dated 16.09.2020 has already been filed in the matter. Some 740 witnesses have been cited in the subject charge-sheet. Trial is yet to commence. In was held that in view of the truncated functioning of courts by reason of the prevailing second wave of the COVID-19 pandemic, it is unlikely that trial will commence anytime soon.
The Delhi HC accordingly set-aside impugned order dated 26.10.2020 made by the learned Special Court in the case arising from F.I.R. No. 59/2020 dated 06.03.2020 registered at P.S.: Crime Branch; and admitted the appellant to regular bail until conclusion of trial.
]]>The SC on May 28, 2021 {Nathu Singh vs. State of U.P. & Ors.} held that the Court cannot be oblivious to the circumstances that Courts are faced with day in and day out, while dealing with anticipatory bail applications.
It was also held by the Bench, comprising of Chief Justice N.V. Ramana, Justice Surya Kant and Justice Aniruddha Bose that even when the Court is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to an accused, there may be circumstances where the High Court is of the opinion that it is necessary to protect the person apprehending arrest for some time, due to exceptional circumstances, until they surrender before the Trial Court. For example, the applicant may plead protection for some time as he/she is the primary caregiver or breadwinner of his/her family members, and needs to make arrangements for them. It was held that in such extraordinary circumstances, when a strict case for grant of anticipatory bail is not made out, and rather the investigating authority has made out a case for custodial investigation, it cannot be stated that the High Court has no power to ensure justice. It was held that it needs no mentioning, but the Supreme Court may also exercise its powers under Article 142 of the Constitution to pass such an order.
The sole question to be answered by the Supreme Court in the present appeals relates to whether the High Court, while dismissing the anticipatory bail applications of the respondents, could have granted them protection from arrest.
The SC held that without going into the question of whether Section 438, Cr.P.C. itself allows for such a power, as it is not necessary to undertake such an exercise in the present case, it is clear that when it comes to the High Court, such a power does exist. It was held that Section 482, Cr.P.C explicitly recognizes the High Court’s inherent power to pass orders to secure the ends of justice. It was held that this provision reflects the reality that no law or rule can possibly account for the complexities of life, and the infinite range of circumstances that may arise in the future.
It was further held that the impugned orders passed by the High Court, in the present appeals, do not meet any of the standards as laid out above for the following reasons: firstly, after the dismissal of the anticipatory bail application, on the basis of the nature and gravity of the offence, the High Court has granted the impugned relief to the respondents without assigning any reasons. Secondly, in granting the relief for a period of 90 days, the Court has seemingly not considered the concerns of the investigating agency, complainant or the proviso under Section 438(1), Cr.P.C., which necessitates that the Court pass such an exceptional discretionary protection order for the shortest duration that is reasonably required. It was held that a period of 90 days, or three months, cannot in any way be considered to be a reasonable one in the present facts and circumstances.
It was concluded that the impugned orders therefore do not withstand legal scrutiny. It was held that the resultant effect of the High Court’s orders is that neither are the respondents found entitled to pre-arrest bail, nor can they be arrested for a long duration i.e. for 90 days. It was held that during the said duration they can roam freely without being apprehensive of coercive action. It was held that the High Court committed a grave error in passing such protection to the respondents/accused. Such a direction by the High Court exceeds its judicial discretion and amounts to judicial largesse, which the Courts do not possess.
For the aforestated reasons, the present appeals were allowed by the SC. The impugned order of the High Court to the extent of granting protection for 90 days to the respondents/accused was set aside, leaving it open to the Investigating Agency to proceed in the matters in accordance with law and complete the investigation.
]]>The SC on April 16, 2021 {In Re: EXPEDITIOUS TRIAL OF CASES UNDER SECTION 138 OF N.I. ACT 1881} held that there is no inherent power of Trial Courts to review or recall the issue of summons. However, it was held that this does not affect the power of the Trial Court under Section 322 of the Cr.P.C. to revisit the order of issue of process in case it is brought to the court’s notice that it lacks jurisdiction to try the complaint.
It was also held by the Constitution Bench, comprising of Chief Justice S. A. BOBDE, Justice L. NAGESWARA RAO, Justice B. R. GAVAI, Justice A. S. BOPANNA and Justice S. RAVINDRA BHAT that Section 258 of the Cr.P.C. is not applicable to complaints under Section 138 of the Act and findings to the contrary in Meters Instruments Private Limited and Another v. Kanchan Mehta (2018) 1 SCC 560 do not lay down correct law.
It was held by the SC that the Magistrates to record reasons before converting trial of complaints under Section 138 of the Act from summary trial to summons trial. It was further held that Inquiry shall be conducted on receipt of complaints under Section 138 of the Act to arrive at sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused, when such accused resides beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court. However, it was held that for the conduct of inquiry under Section 202 of the Code, evidence of witnesses on behalf of the complainant shall be permitted to be taken on affidavit. In suitable cases, the Magistrate can restrict the inquiry to examination of documents without insisting for examination of witnesses.
Further, the High Courts were also requested by the SC to issue practice directions to the Trial Courts to treat service of summons in one complaint under Section 138 forming part of a transaction, as deemed service in respect of all the complaints filed before the same court relating to dishonour of cheques issued as part of the said transaction.
]]>The SC on April 16, 2021 {BOOTA SINGH & OTHERS vs. STATE OF HARYANA} held that Section 42 of the NDPS Act having not been complied with at all, the appellants were entitled to acquittal in terms of law laid down in the Constitution Bench decision of the Court in Karnail Singh v. State of Haryana (2009) 8 SCC 539.
It was held by the Bench, comprising of Justice U.U. Lalit and Justice K.M. Joseph that the compliance with the requirements of Sections 42(1) and 42(2) in regard to writing down the information received and sending a copy thereof to the superior officer, should normally precede the entry, search and seizure by the officer. But in special circumstances involving emergent situations, the recording of the information in writing and sending a copy thereof to the official superior may get postponed by a reasonable period, that is, after the search, entry and seizure. The question is one of urgency and expediency. As laid down in aforesaid judgment of Constitution Bench of the Court.
The question fell for consideration before the SC was whether the case comes within the scope of Section 42 of the NDPS Act when the vehicle in question was a private vehicle belonging to accused Gurdeep Singh and was not a public conveyance, though parked on a public road.
The Supreme Court held that the evidence in the present case clearly shows that the vehicle was not a public conveyance but was a vehicle belonging to accused Gurdeep Singh. It was held that the Registration Certificate of the vehicle, which has been placed on record also does not indicate it to be a Public Transport Vehicle. It was further held that the explanation to Section 43 shows that a private vehicle would not come within the expression “public place” as explained in Section 43 of the NDPS Act.
It was concluded that it is an admitted position that there was total non-compliance of the requirements of Section 42 of the NDPS Act. In the circumstances, it was held that the courts below fell in error in rejecting the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants. The Supreme Court allowed the appeal, set-aside the view taken by the High Court and acquitted the appellants of the charge levelled against them.
]]>The SC on November 5, 2020 {HINDUSTAN UNILEVER LIMITED vs. THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH } held that in the absence of the Company, the Nominated Person cannot be convicted or vice versa. It was held that since the Company was not convicted by the trial court, it finds that the finding of the High Court to revisit the judgment will be unfair to the appellant/Nominated Person who has been facing trial for more than last 30 years.
It was held by the Bench, comprising of Justice L. NAGESWARA RAO, Justice HEMANT GUPTA & Justice AJAY RASTOGI that there is no material distinction between Section 141 of the NI Act and Section 17 of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 which makes the Company as well as the Nominated Person to be held guilty of the offences and/or liable to be proceeded and punished accordingly. The SC held for maintaining the prosecution in case of vicarious liability, arraigning of a company as an accused is imperative, and if the company is acquitted, the director/ nominated person cannot be held liable.
The SC held that in view of Section 97 of the Food Safety and Standards Act, 2006, as also under Section 6 of the General Clauses Act, 1897, the proceedings would continue under the Act. No benefit can be taken under the 2006 Act as the prosecution and punishment under the Act is protected. The SC negated and rejected the argument by the appellant that pursuant to the repeal of the Act, only punishment of fine has been contemplated under the 2006 Act, thus, since the provisions of the 2006 Act are beneficial to the accused, the accused is entitled to such benefits provided by the 2006 Act.
Finally, the SC held that the order of remand to the trial court to fill up the lacuna is not a fair option exercised by the High Court as the failure of the trial court to convict the Company renders the entire conviction of the Nominated Person as unsustainable. The appeals were allowed and the order passed by the High Court was set aside. Resultantly the complaint was dismissed.
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The SC on Oct 26, 2020 {Raveen Kumar vs State of Himachal Pradesh} held that interference of an appellate Court against acquittal would be justified in case of patent errors of law, grave miscarriage of justice, or perverse findings of fact.
It was further observed by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice SURYA KANT & Justice HRISHIKESH ROY, that findings of fact recorded by a court can be held to be perverse if the findings have been arrived at by ignoring or excluding relevant material or by taking into consideration irrelevant/inadmissible material or if they are ‘against the weight of evidence’ or if they suffer from the ‘vice of irrationality’.
The question falling for consideration in present case before the SC was what is the extent of reliance upon a document with which the other side was not confronted with during cross-examination and whether non-examination of independent witnesses vitiates the prosecution case.
It was held that if admission is proved and if it is thereafter to be used against the party who has made it the question comes within the provisions of Section 145 of the Evidence Act. It was held that the provisions in the Indian Evidence Act that “admission is not conclusive proof” are to be considered in regard to two features of evidence. First, what weight is to be attached to an admission? In order to attach weight it has to be found out whether the admission is clear, unambiguous and is a relevant piece of evidence. Second, even if the admission is proved in accordance with the provisions of the Evidence Act and if it is to be used against the party who has made it, “it is sound that if a witness is under cross-examination on oath, he should be given an opportunity, if the documents are to be used against him, to tender his explanation and to clear up the point of ambiguity or dispute. This is a general salutary and intelligible rule”. Therefore, it was held that a mere proof of admission, after the person whose admission it is alleged to be has concluded his evidence, will be of no avail and cannot be utilised against him.
It was held that there is distinction between ‘replies’ submitted to the Court in some pending proceedings, as compared to the statements recorded by the police under Section 161 of CrPC. It was held that nevertheless, a Court should be overcautious to place reliance on a piece of evidence with which the concerned witness has not been confronted despite an opportunity to do so. It was held that although there is no need to separately prove the court records emanating during trial but no legal presumption can be extended to the veracity of the contents of such documents. It was held that the reply filed in court proceedings, at best, can be treated as an admission; must not only be proved, but also the opposite party must be confronted with it at the stage of cross examination.
It was held that the High Court has correctly noted in the present case that no opportunity to controvert the reply document was given to the prosecution, nor was PW5 confronted with it. It was held that no weight can be accorded to such reply.
It was held that it would be gainsaid that lack of independent witnesses are not fatal to the prosecution case. However, it was held that such omissions cast an added duty on Courts to adopt a greater-degree of care while scrutinising the testimonies of the police officers, which if found reliable can form the basis of a successful conviction.
It was concluded by the SC that since irrelevant material was impermissibly relied upon by the trial Court to arrive at an acquittal, the High Court was adequately justified to interfere with and reverse the findings.
]]>It was further observed by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice SURYA KANT & Justice HRISHIKESH ROY, that the earlier position of law which allowed the solitary ground of the complainant also being the investigating officer, to become a spring board for an accused to be catapulted to acquittal, has been reversed. Instead, it was held that it is now necessary to demonstrate that there has either been actual bias or there is real likelihood of bias, with no sweeping presumption being permissible.
It was held that the appellants have at no stage claimed that there existed any enmity or other motive for the police to falsely implicate them and let the real culprits walk free. Further, it was held that such a huge quantity of charas could not have been planted against the appellants by the police on its own.
Further, it was held that not only the alternative version projected by the appellants is vague and improbable, but it escapes comprehension how non investigation of a defence theory disclosed only at an advanced stage of trial, could indicate bias on part of the police.
It was held that as correctly appreciated by the High Court in detail, non examination of independent witnesses would not ipso facto entitle one to seek acquittal. It was held that though a heighted standard of care is imposed on the court in such instances but there is nothing to suggest that the High Court was not cognizant of this duty. It was held that rather, the consequence of upholding the trial Court’s reasoning would amount to compulsory examination of each and every witness attached to the formation of a document. It was held that not only is the imposition of such a standard of proof unsupported by statute but it is also unreasonably onerous.
The SC held that there is no gainsaid that High Courts are well within their power to reverse an acquittal and award an appropriate sentence; though they cautiously exercise such powers in practice. It was held that illustratively, a few permissible reasons which would necessitate such interference by the High Court include patent errors of law, grave miscarriage of justice, or perverse findings of fact.
It was held that the safeguards for search of a person would not extend to his bag or other article being carried by them. Given how the narcotics have been discovered from a backpack. The SC does not find any merit in these appeals which were accordingly dismissed.
]]>It was observed by the Bench, comprising of Justice U U Lalit, Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar and Justice Vineet Saran, that the history of the enactment of Section 167(2), CrPC and the safeguard of ‘default bail’ contained in the Proviso thereto is intrinsically linked to Article 21 and is nothing but a legislative exposition of the constitutional safeguard that no person shall be detained except in accordance with rule of law. It was emphasized that the right of the accused to be set at liberty takes precedence over the right of the State to carry on the investigation and submit a chargesheet.
The question falling for consideration before the SC was whether the indefeasible right accruing to the appellant under Section 167(2), CrPC gets extinguished by subsequent filing of an additional complaint by the investigating agency. And whether the Court should take into consideration the time of filing of the application for bail, based on default of the investigating agency or the time of disposal of the application for bail while deciding application u/s Sec 167(2).
The SC held that once the accused files an application for bail under the Proviso to Section 167(2) he is deemed to have ‘availed of’ or enforced his right to be released on default bail, accruing after expiry of the stipulated time limit for investigation. Thus, it was held that if the accused applies for bail under Section 167(2), CrPC read with Section 36A (4), NDPS Act upon expiry of 180 days or the extended period, as the case may be, the Court must release him on bail forthwith without any unnecessary delay after getting necessary information from the public prosecutor. It was held that such prompt action will restrict the prosecution from frustrating the legislative mandate to release the accused on bail in case of default by the investigative agency.
It was held that the right to be released on default bail continues to remain enforceable if the accused has applied for such bail, notwithstanding pendency of the bail application; or subsequent filing of the chargesheet or a report seeking extension of time by the prosecution before the Court; or filing of the chargesheet during the interregnum when challenge to the rejection of the bail application is pending before a higher Court.
It was held that however, where the accused fails to apply for default bail when the right accrues to him, and subsequently a chargesheet, additional complaint or a report seeking extension of time is preferred before the Magistrate, the right to default bail would be extinguished. It was held that the Magistrate would be at liberty to take cognizance of the case or grant further time for completion of the investigation, as the case may be, though the accused may still be released on bail under other provisions of the CrPC.
It was held that notwithstanding the order of default bail passed by the Court, by virtue of Explanation I to Section 167(2), the actual release of the accused from custody is contingent on the directions passed by the competent Court granting bail. It was held that if the accused fails to furnish bail and/or comply with the terms and conditions of the bail order within the time stipulated by the Court, his continued detention in custody is valid.
The appeal was allowed accordingly by the SC.
]]>It was further observed by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice SURYA KANT & Justice Hrishikesh Roy, that there is no proposition in law that relatives are to be treated as untruthful witnesses. On the contrary, it was held that reason has to be shown when a plea of partiality is raised to show that the witnesses had reason to shield actual culprit and falsely implicate the accused.
In the present case, the Madhya Pradesh High Court, Indore Bench approved the conviction of the appellants under Section 148, 302 read with Section 149 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “the IPC”). The same was assailed before the SC.
It was held by the SC that Babu Lal (PW11) is an unrelated witness. It was held that his testimony substantially supports the evidence of PW3 and PW12 in all material particulars. It was further held that in any case, being related to the deceased does not necessarily mean that they will falsely implicate innocent persons.
It was held that it goes without saying that enmity is a double-edged weapon which cuts both ways. It was held that it may constitute a motive for the commission of the crime and at the same time it may also provide a motive for false implication. It was also held that in the present case there is evidence to establish motive and when the prosecution adduced positive evidence showing the direct involvement of the accused in the crime, motive assumes importance.
It was held that if the witnesses are otherwise trustworthy, past enmity by itself will not discredit any testimony. It was held that in fact the history of bad blood gives a clear motive for the crime. It was held by the SC that therefore this aspect does not in its assessment, aid the defence in the present matter.
It was held that some witness may not support the prosecution story for their own reasons and in such situation, it is necessary for the Court to determine whether the other available evidence comprehensively proves the charge. It was held that in this case, it is seen that the prosecution version is cogent and supported by three eyewitnesses who have given a consistent account of the incident.
The SC concluded that proceeding on the above basis and on careful examination of the manner in which the learned Trial Judge analysed the evidence and rendered his verdict, the conviction of the appellants according to its assessment, was rightly ordered and correctly upheld by the High Court. It was held that the appeal stands dismissed.
]]>The SC Bench, comprising of Justice Ashok Bhushan, Justice R. Subhash Reddy & Justice M.R. Shah observed that it emerges that there is no hard and fast rule that in a case of single injury Section 302 IPC would not be attracted. It was held that it depends upon the facts and circumstances of each case. It was further held that the nature of injury, the part of the body where it is caused, the weapon used in causing such injury are the indicators of the fact whether the accused caused the death of the deceased with an intention of causing death or not. It was held that it cannot be laid down as a rule of universal application that whenever the death occurs on account of a single blow, Section 302 IPC is ruled out.
In the present matter before the SC, for conviction under Section 302 IPC, the original accused has preferred the present appeal.
It is the case on behalf of the appellant – accused that as it is a case of single injury, Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted and the case would fall under Section 304 Part II IPC.
The SC held that in the present case, at the place of incident the beer was being served; all of them who participated in the beer party were friends. It was held that in the facts and circumstances, culpable homicide cannot be said to be a murder within the definition of Section 300 IPC and, therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case and the manner in which the incident started in a beer party, it is of the opinion that Section 302 IPC shall not be attracted.
It was concluded that considering the totality of the facts and circumstances of the case and more particularly that the accused inflicted the blow with a weapon like knife and he inflicted the injury on the deceased on the vital part of the body, it is to be presumed that causing such bodily injury was likely to cause the death. Therefore, the case would fall under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not under Section 304 Part II of the IPC.
In view of the above, the appeal was allowed in part by the SC. It was held by the SC that the impugned judgment and order passed by the High Court confirming the conviction of the accused for the offence punishable under Section 302 IPC was modified from that of under Section 302 IPC to Section 304 Part I IPC. It was held by the SC that the accused is held guilty for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part I IPC and sentenced to undergo 8 years R.I. with a fine of Rs.10,000/ and, in default, to further undergo one year R.I. The appeal was allowed to the aforesaid extent by the SC.
]]>The SC on Sep 04, 2020 {RAGHAV GUPTA vs STATE (NCT OF DELHI) AND ANOTHER} held that several grounds have been urged to challenge the prosecution, however the appeal can be disposed of on a single undisputed ground.
It was observed by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice R.F. NARIMAN, Justice NAVIN SINHA & Justice INDIRA BANERJEE, that the appellant questions his prosecution under Rule 32(e) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Rules, 1955 (hereinafter called as “the Rules”) framed under the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short “the Act”).
In the present case, the report of the Public Analyst dated 30.05.2011, held that the sample confirmed to standards but was misbranded being in violation of Rule 32(e), lacking in necessary declaration of lot/batch numbers. Notices were issued to the appellant under Section 251 of the Criminal Procedure Code (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Code’). The appellant preferred an application for discharge under Section 294 of the Code read with Section 192 of the Act inter alia on the ground that the product had the necessary barcode on it and which contained all the relevant information as required by Rule 32(e) such as batch no./code no./lot no. The application having been rejected, the appellant raised the same ground before the High Court which also failed to consider the same. Hence, the present appeal.
The SC held that the barcode was available on the sample is not in dispute. It was held that in view of the fact that the relevant information under Rule 32(e) with regard to the lot/code/batch identification to facilitate it being traced to the manufacturer are available in the barcode and which can be decoded by a barcode scanner, it is of the considered opinion that no useful purpose is going to be served by allowing the present prosecution to continue and it will be an abuse of the process of law, causing sheer waste of time, causing unnecessary harassment to the appellant, if the prosecution is allowed to continue.
The SC therefore allowed the appeal and quashed the prosecution of the appellant in Patiala House Court, New Delhi.
]]>The SC on August 31, 2020 {IN RE: PRASHANT BHUSHAN AND ANR.} held that the allegations made by the contemnor are scandalous and are capable of shaking the very edifice of the judicial administration and also shaking the faith of common man in the administration of justice.
The SC Bench, comprising of Justice Arun Mishra, Justice B.R. Gavai & Justice Krishna Murari further held that after going through the various averments made in the affidavit in reply for supporting truth as defence, they are of the considered view that the defence taken is neither in the public interest nor bona fide one, but the contemnor has indulged in making reckless allegations against the institution of administration of justice. It was held that the averments are based on political consideration, and therefore in its view cannot be considered to support the case of the contemnor of truth as a defence.
It was argued on behalf of contemnor before the SC that the factors relevant for sentencing are the offender, the offence, the convicting judgment, statutory or other defences relating to a substantial interference with justice, truth, bona fides, and public interest in disclosure.
The present judgment of the SC decided quantum of sentence to be imposed on the contemnor, after having adjudged Shri Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, guilty of contempt vide judgment dated 14.08.2020.
The SC held that if a scathing attack is made on the judges, it would become difficult for them to work fearlessly and with the objectivity of approach to the issues. It was held that the judgment can be criticized. However, motives to the Judges need not be attributed, as it brings the administration of justice into disrepute.
The SC held that the defence taken in the affidavit cannot be said to be either bona fide or in the public interest. It was held that both the tweets coupled with averments in the reply affidavit are capable of shaking the confidence of the public in the institution as a whole. It was also held that the second tweet is capable of creating an impression that the entire Supreme Court in the last six years has played a vital role in the destruction of democracy.
The Court held that it cannot abdicate its duty and has to be uninfluenced by the statements published in various articles published in the media and opinions expressed therein. It has to decide the case uninfluenced by such opinions.
It was held that free Speech is essential to democracy can also not be disputed, but it cannot denigrate one of the institutions of the democracy. It was held that the contemnor's conduct reflects adamance and ego, which has no place to exist in the system of administration of justice and in noble profession, and no remorse is shown for the harm done to the institution to which he belongs. At the same time, it was held that the SC cannot retaliate merely because the contemnor has made a statement that he is neither invoking the magnanimity or the mercy of this Court and he is ready to submit to the penalty that can be lawfully be inflicted upon him for what the Court has determined to be an offence.
It was held that the contemnor not only gave wide publicity to the second statement submitted before the Court on 24.08.2020 prior to the same being tendered to the Court, but also gave various interviews with regard to sub judice matter, thereby further attempting to bring down the reputation of this Court. It was held that If the SC does not take cognizance of such conduct it will give a wrong message to the lawyers and litigants throughout the country. However, it was held by the SC that by showing magnanimity, instead of imposing any severe puishment, it is sentencing the contemnor with a nominal fine of Re.1/ (Rupee one).
The SC sentenced the contemnor with a fine of Re.1/ (Rupee one) which is to be deposited with the Registry of the Court by 15.09.2020, failing which it was ordered that he shall undergo a simple imprisonment for a period of three months and further be debarred from practising in the Supreme Court for a period of three years.
Accordingly, the present proceedings including all pending applications, were disposed of by the SC.
]]>The SC on Aug 21, 2020 {SRI V.N.KRISHNA MURTHY & ANR. vs SRI RAVIKUMAR & ORS.} held that an appeal under Section 96 of the Civil Procedure Code, would be maintainable only at the instance of a person aggrieved by and dissatisfied with the judgment and decree. It was held that the expression ‘person aggrieved’ does not include a person who suffers from a psychological or an imaginary injury; a person aggrieved must, therefore, necessarily be one, whose right or interest has been adversely affected or jeopardized.
It was further observed by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice L. Nageswara Rao, Justice Krishna Murari & Justice S. Ravindra Bhat, that Section 96 and 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure provide for preferring an appeal from any original decree or from decree in appeal respectively. It was held that the aforesaid provisions do not enumerate the categories of persons who can file an appeal. It was held that it is a settled legal proposition that a stranger cannot be permitted to file an appeal in any proceedings unless he satisfies the Court that he falls with the category of aggrieved persons. It was held that it is only where a judgment and decree prejudicially affects a person who is not party to the proceedings, he can prefer an appeal with the leave of the Appellate Court.
In the present case, during the pendency of the suit proceedings, the appellants made an application under Order 1 Rule 10 (2) CPC for impleadment which was dismissed by the Trial Court. The order was challenged by filing a Writ Petition before the High Court which came to be dismissed as infructuous as the suit itself came to be decided, in the meantime - that order was finally assailed herein before the SC.
Applying the tests laid down by precedents, the SC held that appellants can neither be said to be aggrieved persons nor bound by the judgment and decree of the Trial Court in any manner. It was held that the relief claimed in the suit was cancellation of agreement to sell. It was held that the sale deeds which were the basis of the claim of the appellants were executed on the basis of General Power of Attorney, and had nothing to do with the agreement to sell which was subject matter of suit. It was held that the judgment and decree of the Trial Court is in no sense a judgment in rem and it is binding only as between the plaintiffs and defendants of the suit, and not upon the appellants.
It was held by the SC that the appellants have thus failed to demonstrate that they are prejudicially or adversely affected by the decree in question or any of their legal rights stands jeopardized so as to bring them within the ambit of the expression ‘person aggrieved’ entitling them to maintain appeal against the decree. In view of the facts and discussions, it was held that there is no infirmity in the judgment of the High Court dismissing the application filed by the appellants seeking leave to appeal against the decree. The appeals, accordingly, were dismissed by the SC.
]]>It was further observed by the SC Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice S. ABDUL NAZEER & Justice SURYA KANT, that it must be highlighted that appellate Courts ought not to routinely re-appreciate the evidence in a criminal case. It was held that this is not only for reasons of procedure, expediency, or finality; but because the trial Court is best placed to holistically appreciate the demeanour of a witness and other evidence on record. It was held by the SC that given the concurrent finding of the Courts below on key aspects of the robbery, it does not find it a fit case for such re-appraisal of evidence.
It was held that pleas of unsoundness of mind under Section 84 of IPC or mitigating circumstances like juvenility of age, ordinarily ought to be raised during trial itself. It was held that belated claims not only prevent proper production and appreciation of evidence, but they also undermine the genuineness of the defence’s case.
It was held that mere production of photocopy of an OPD card and statement of mother on affidavit have little, if any, evidentiary value. It was further held that in order to successfully claim defence of mental unsoundness under Section 84 of IPC, the accused must show by preponderance of probabilities that he/she suffered from a serious-enough mental disease or infirmity which would affect the individual’s ability to distinguish right from wrong. Further, it was held that it must be established that the accused was afflicted by such disability particularly at the time of the crime and that but for such impairment, the crime would not have been committed. It was held that the reasons given by the High Court for disbelieving these defences are thus well reasoned and unimpeachable.
The SC held that given such inability of the appellant to establish juvenility or insanity, does not raise any doubt regarding guilt; and considering the detailed reasons accorded by the High Court, the reliable testimony of twelve witnesses as well as the leniency shown in sentencing, it sees no reasons to interfere with the impugned order(s). The appeal was accordingly dismissed.
]]>The SC on August 19, 2020 {Rhea Chakraborty vs State of Bihar & Ors.} held that transfer of investigation to the CBI cannot be a routine occurrence but should be in exceptional circumstances. It was held that one factor which however is considered relevant for induction of the Central Agency is to retain “public confidence in the impartial working of the State agencies”.
It was held by the Single Judge of SC, Justice Hrishikesh Roy, that the consistent view of the Court is that it is not for the accused to choose the investigating agency. In the instant case, it was held that political interference against both states is alleged which has the potential of discrediting the investigation. It was held that the legal process must therefore be focused upon revelation of the correct facts through credible and legally acceptable investigation. It was held that it must be determined whether the unnatural death was the result of some criminal acts. It was held that in order to lend credibility to the investigation and its conclusion, it would be desirable to specify the authority, which should conduct the investigation in this matter.
In the present case, the Transfer Petition was filed under section 406 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short “CrPC”) read with Order XXXIX of the Supreme Court Rules, 2013 with prayer for transfer of the FIR No. 241 of 2020 (dated 25.7.2020) under Sections 341, 342, 380, 406, 420, 306, 506 and 120B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short “IPC”) registered at the Rajeev Nagar Police Station, Patna and all consequential proceedings, from the jurisdiction of the Additional Chief Judicial Magistrate III, Patna Sadar, to the Additional Chief Metropolitan Magistrate, Bandra Mumbai. The matter was related to the unnatural death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput on 14.6.2020, at his Bandra residence at Mumbai.
The SC held that under the federal design envisaged by the Constitution, Police is a state subject under List II of Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Therefore, it was held that investigation of a crime should normally be undertaken by the concerned state’s police, where the case is registered.
It was held that the earlier precedents suggest that transfer plea under Section 406 CrPC were granted in cases where the Court believed that the trial may be prejudiced and fair and impartial proceedings cannot be carried on, if the trial continues.
The SC held that having considered the contour of the power under section 406 CrPC, it must be concluded that only cases and appeals (not investigation) can be transferred.
It was further held that the proceeding under Section 174 CrPC is limited to the inquiry carried out by the police to find out the apparent cause of unnatural death. It was held that these are not in the nature of investigation, undertaken after filing of FIR under Section 154 CrPC. In the instant case, it was held that in Mumbai, no FIR has been registered as yet. It was held that the Mumbai Police has neither considered the matter under Section 175 (2) CrPC, suspecting commission of a cognizable offence nor proceeded for registration of FIR under Section 154 or referred the matter under Section 157 CrPC, to the nearest magistrate having jurisdiction.
It was held that precedents suggest that at the stage of investigation, it cannot be said that the concerned police station does not have territorial jurisdiction to investigate the case.
Having regard to the law enunciated earlier by the Court, it was held by the SC that it must be held that the Patna police committed no illegality in registering the Complaint. It was held that looking at the nature of the allegations in the Complaint which also relate to misappropriation and breach of trust, the exercise of jurisdiction by the Bihar Police appears to be in order.
It was further held that the ongoing investigation by the CBI is held to be lawful. It was directed by the SC that in the event a new case is registered at Mumbai on the same issue, in the fitness of things, it would be appropriate if the latter case too gets investigated by the same agency, on the strength of the Court’s order. It was held that such enabling order will make it possible for the CBI to investigate the new case, avoiding the rigors of Section 6 of the DSPE Act, requiring consent from the State of Maharashtra.
In such backdrop, it was held by the SC that to ensure public confidence in the investigation and to do complete justice in the matter, the Court considers it appropriate to invoke the powers conferred by Article 142 of the Constitution. It was held that as a Court exercising lawful jurisdiction for the assigned roster, no impediment is seen for exercise of plenary power in the present matter.
Therefore it was concluded by the SC that while according approval for the ongoing CBI investigation, if any other case is registered on the death of the actor Sushant Singh Rajput and the surrounding circumstances of his unnatural death, the CBI is directed to investigate the new case as well. The petition was accordingly disposed of by the SC.
]]>The SC on July 30, 2020 {PREM CHAND vs STATE OF HARYANA} held that there is no evidence that the samples were not tampered within the intervening period, therefore benefit of doubt accrues in favor of the accused. It was held that moreover, the report of the public analyst does not mention that the sample was either “insect infested” or was “unfit for human consumption”, in the absence of such an opinion, the prosecution has failed to establish the requirements of Section 2 (1a)(f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954.
It was also held by the Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice SURYA KANT & Justice KRISHNA MURARI, that the cross-examination of the medical officer (P.W2) reveals that he did not find any weevils/worms in the sample on seeing it with naked eyes. It was held although, the food inspector (P.W1) stated that the sample was dispatched to the public analyst on the next date, however, no parcel receipt was produced to that extent. It was also held although, the sample was received in the office of the public analyst on 20.08.1982 and the report was finalized on 07.09.1982 after the delay of 18 days.
In the present case, the High Court upturned Trial Court judgment of acquittal into one of conviction after 27 years from the date of incident and 14 years after the date of trial court judgment. The present appeal before the SC arose out of the impugned judgment, whereby the High Court set aside the judgment of the trial court acquitting the appellant and convicted him for the offences under Section 2 (1a) (f) of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act, 1954 (in short, ‘the Act’) punishable under Section 16(1A) and Section 16(1)(a)(ii) of the Act for selling adulterated Haldi Powder and selling it without licence.
It was held that the impugned order of conviction passed by the High Court is not sustainable. The SC set aside the same and upheld the order of acquittal passed by the trial court. Accordingly, the appeal stood allowed.
]]>The SC on July 29, 2020 {LT. COL. S. S. BEDI vs UNION OF INDIA & ORS.} restored the punishment of penalty of cashiering by taking into account the reprehensible conduct of the Appellant abusing a position of trust being a Doctor which was held to be not condonable.
It was observed by the Bench, comprising of Justice L. NAGESWARA RAO, Justice HEMANT GUPTA & Justice S. RAVINDRA BHAT, that the tribunal converted the sentence of cashiering into a fine of Rs.50,000/- by holding that the Appellant has a blemishless record of service. It was further observed that the Tribunal found the imposition of the punishment of cashiering from service shockingly disproportionate. It was observed that the Tribunal also highlighted the delay in the complaint made against the Appellant. The SC held that it is not convinced with the reasons given by the Tribunal for converting the sentence from cashiering to imposition of fine of Rs.50,000/-.
It was, however, directed that the Respondents to consider the entire record of service of the Appellant and his advanced age while taking a decision to initiate proceedings under the Army Pension Regulations. It was held that in case the Respondents decide not to initiate proceedings under Army Pension Regulations, the Appellant shall be entitled for all pensionary benefits.
In the present case, a complaint was made by two women against the Appellant on 15.05.1986 that he misbehaved with them during checkup by inappropriately touching their private parts.The Appellant was commissioned in the Indian Army Medical Corps on 24.07.1966.
It was held by the SC that the evidence of PW-13 Lt. Col. R. Sharma, Physician is to the effect that there was necessity to examine the cardio vascular system of the patient who was suffering with bronchial asthma which involved exposure of chest/breasts and touching of the breasts. However, squeezing of the breasts and nipples of a lady patient - the allegations against appellant- was unnecessary.
It was held by the SC that there was no motive for false implication of the Appellant by the complainants, therefore, it is in agreement with the conclusion of the General Court Martial and the Tribunal that the Appellant is guilty of the charge of using criminal force against two women patients. The appeal was accordingly disposed of.
]]>The SC on July 28, 2020 {Parminder Kaur @ P.P. Kaur @ Soni vs State of Punjab} held that ordinarily, the Supreme Court ought not to reappreciate evidence. However, it was held that where the courts below have dealt with the material on record in a cavalier or mechanical manner which is likely to cause gross injustice, then the Court in such exceptional circumstances may justifiably reappraise the evidence to advance the cause of justice. It was held that there is no gainsaying that such reassessment ought not to take place routinely and ought not to become substitution of an otherwise plausible view taken by the Courts below.
It was held by the Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice SURYA KANT & Justice KRISHNA MURARI, that the Courts below failed in making the desired attempt to delve deep into the factual matrix of this case. It was held that many aspects have completely been ignored or only dealt with hastily. It was held that the reasoning is generic and is premised upon generalisations which may not be necessarily true always. It was held that it is indisputable that parents would not ordinarily endanger the reputation of their minor daughter merely to falsely implicate their opponents, but such clichés ought not to be the sole basis of dismissing reasonable doubts created and/or defences set out by the accused.
Similarly, It was held that the five day delay in registration of the FIR, in the facts and circumstances of this case, gains importance as the father of the victim is an eyewitness to a part of the occurrence. It was held that it is difficult to appreciate that a father would await a second incident to happen before moving the law into motion. It was observed that sweeping assumptions concerning delays in registration of FIRs for sexual offences, send a problematic signal to society and create opportunities for abuse by miscreants. Instead, the facts of each individual case and the behaviour of the parties involved ought to be analysed by courts before reaching a conclusion on the reason and effect of delay in registration of FIR. In the facts of the present case, it was held that neither is Section 366A by itself a sexual offence in the strict sense nor do the inactions of the prosecutrix or her father inspire confidence on genuineness of the prosecution story. It was held that no steps were taken to avail of medical examination of the victim, nor was the Panchayat or any social forum approached for any form of redress till the occurrence of the second alleged incident.
It was held that it is the duty of the prosecution to lead the best evidence in its possession, and failure to do so ought to lead to an adverse inference.
The present Criminal Appeal before the SC had been preferred by Parminder Kaur, impugning the judgment of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana through which her challenge to a judgment passed by the Additional Sessions Judge, Barnala was turned down, thereby confirming her conviction of three years rigorous imprisonment and fine of Rs. 2000 under Sections 366A and 506 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (“IPC”). The trial Court had summarily disregarded the contradictions highlighted by the defence side, on the premise that such contradictions had no material bearing and that there was no reason to disbelieve the prosecutrix. The High Court too had opined that PW1 and PW2 have completely corroborated each other and their testimonies were impeccable.
The SC held that these reasons are not only contrary to the record but they also lead to an impermissible reversal of the burden of proof imposed in criminal trials. It was held that there are numerous clear contradictions between the testimonies of these two star witnesses, which it finds fatal to the prosecution case.
It was held that in addition to the inconsistencies which cast a serious shadow of doubt over the version of events put forth by the prosecution, the accounts of PW1 and PW2 are superficial and lack detail. It was held that important links of the story, including what happened in the crucial five minutes when the girl was locked inside the room or how the male tenant reacted, are missing.
The SC held that under the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 after the prosecution closes its evidence and examines all its witnesses, the accused is given an opportunity of explanation through Section 313(1)(b). It was held that any alternate version of events or interpretation proffered by the accused must be carefully analysed and considered by the trial Court in compliance with the mandate of Section 313(4). It was held that such opportunity is a valuable right of the accused to seek justice and defend oneself. It was held that failure of the trial Court to fairly apply its mind and consider the defence, could endanger the conviction itself. It was held that unlike the prosecution which needs to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, the accused merely needs to create reasonable doubt or prove their alternate version by mere preponderance of probabilities. Thus, it was held that once a plausible version has been put forth in defence at the Section 313 CrPC examination stage, then it is for the prosecution to negate such defence plea.
The SC held it is of the considered view that the prosecution has failed to discharge its burden of proving the guilt of the appellant under Section 366A and 506 of the IPC beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, the appeal was allowed and the conviction and sentence awarded by the Courts below were set aside by the SC. The appellant was acquitted and consequently set free by the SC.
]]>The SC on July 22, 2020 {IN RE PRASHANT BHUSHAN & ANR.} held that it is prima facie, of the view that the statements on Twitter made by Sh. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate, have brought the administration of justice in disrepute and are capable of undermining the dignity and authority of the Institution of Supreme Court in general and the office of the Chief Justice of India in particular, in the eyes of public at large.
The SC Bench, comprising of Justice Arun Mishra and Justice B.R. Gavai & Justice Krishna Murari further held that it takes suo motu cognizance of the tweets and suo motu register the proceedings. The Court issued notice to the Attorney General for India and to Mr. Prashant Bhushan, Advocate also, for 05/08/2020.
The following tweets were allegedly published by Mr. Prashant Bhushan on twitter:
“CJI rides a 50 Lakh motorcycle belonging to a BJP leader at Raj Bhavan Nagpur, without a mask or helmet, at a time when he keeps the SC in Lockdown mode denying citizens their fundamental right to access justice!”
“When historians in future look back at the last 6 years to see how democracy has been destroyed in India even without a formal Emergency, they will particularly mark the role of the Supreme Court in this destruction, & more particularly the role of the last 4 CJIs.”
The present petition was placed before the SC on the administrative side by the Registry, for consideration, whether it should be listed for hearing or not as permission of the Attorney General for India has not been obtained by the petitioner to file the petition. After examining the matter on administrative side, the SC directed the matter to be listed before the Court to pass appropriate orders.
]]>The SC on July 08, 2020 {KAMAL PRAKASH JAIN vs THE STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH} held that it is not inclined to interfere with the impugned order passed by the High Court whereby the High Court dismissed the second application for anticipatory bail filed by the petitioner.
It was however held by the Bench, comprising of Justice N.V. RAMANA, Justice SURYA KANT & Justice KRISHNA MURARI, that taking into consideration the present covid situation, it grants four weeks’ time to the petitioner to surrender before the concerned trial court and file an application for regular bail. It was held that if such an application is filed by the petitioner, the trial court is directed to consider and dispose of the same in accordance with law expeditiously.
The SC held that for a period of four weeks, no coercive action shall be taken against the petitioner. However, the SC directed the petitioner to co-operate with the investigation. As a sequel the special leave petition stood dismissed by the SC.
]]>The SC on July 07, 2020 {BHUPINDER SINGH vs UNITECH LTD.} held that a
case for the grant of interim bail has been made out on humanitarian grounds since both the parents of the applicant have tested positive for Covid-19 and having regard to their advanced age. It was held that the order is being passed only on the basis of these facts and circumstances.
It was however directed by the Bench, comprising of Justice D.Y. Chandrachud & Justice M.R. Shah, that the passport of the applicant shall be deposited with
the trial court and the applicant shall report on every Sunday before the nearest local police station.
The application for interim bail had been filed by Sanjay Chandra, who was in custody since 17 August 2017. The ground on which interim bail had been sought before the SC was that the parents of the applicant, who are 81 years and 78 years of age respectively, had tested positive for Covid-19.
The SC directed that the applicant, Sanjay Chandra, shall be released on interim bail for a period of thirty days from the date of his actual release.
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