Property Lawyer: Documents subsequent to date of disputed document cannot be used for comparison of signatures by expert; SC.
- 06:30Supreme Court of India
Justice Mohan M. Shantanagoudar, Justice N. V. Ramana and Justice Ajay Rastogi
The SC { Chennadi Jalapathi Reddy v. Baddam Pratapa Reddy (Dead) & Anr.} holds that it is well settled that the Court must be cautious while evaluating expert evidence, which is a weak type of evidence and not substantive in nature. Further holds that it is also settled that it may not be safe to solely rely upon such evidence, and the Court may seek independent and reliable corroboration in the facts of a given case. Generally, mere expert evidence as to a fact is not regarded as conclusive proof of it.
The SC holds in the present case, that it is the duty of the Court to approach opinion evidence cautiously while determining its reliability and that the Court may seek independent corroboration of such evidence as a general rule of prudence. The expert evidence should rarely be given precedence over substantive evidence.
It was held, merely because the plaintiff’s signature was not present on the agreement of sale, this would not ipso facto nullify the agreement altogether. It was held in present case, the agreement was signed by the first defendant and clearly reveals that he had agreed to sell the property to the plaintiff for a due consideration of Rs. 1,20,000/. This agreement was followed by Ext. A2, which shows the payment and receipt of the earnest money. In addition to the signature of the first defendant, this receipt bears the signature of the plaintiff on revenue stamps. It was held, Ext. A1 and Ext. A2 are part of the same transaction. Thus, the contention that absence of the plaintiff’s signature on Ext. A1 nullifies the agreement altogether, cannot be accepted and accordingly rejected by the SC.
The SC further holds that it would be apposite to observe that the weight to be accorded to such an opinion depends on the extent of familiarity shown by the witness with the disputed handwriting. This, in turn, depends on the frequency with which the witness has had occasion to notice and observe the handwriting, his own power of observation, and how recent such observations were.
In the facts of the present case it was held by the SC - the evidence on record of DW 3 who is brother of the defendant no. 1 go on to show the familiarity of DW3 with the handwriting of the first defendant, it was held by the SC that the testimony of DW3 may safely be relied upon, and must be accorded similar, if not greater, weight than the expert evidence adduced by the defendants to advance their case. It was held that this conclusion is further strengthened by the fact that the first defendant neither challenged DW3’s admission nor his acquaintance with the disputed handwriting, although it was open for him to do so by way of re-examination.
The SC holds in present case the admission by DW3 is further supported by the cogent and consistent testimony of the plaintiff (PW1) and attesting witnesses (PWs 2 and 3), and the fact that the first defendant has not denied his signature on Ext. A2 (the receipt of payment of earnest money). Having regard to the totality of the facts and circumstances, it was held by the SC that the disputed signature of the first defendant on Ext. A1 is genuine. Moreover, keeping in mind the principle that expert evidence should not be given precedence over substantive evidence, it was held by the SC, the High Court was not justified in giving precedence to the opinion of the expert (DW2) and solely relying upon his testimony to set aside the judgment and decree of the Trial Court. Accordingly, the judgment of the HC was set aside and the suit for specific performance stands decreed by the SC.
It was held by the SC that there is another reason why reliance on the opinion of the expert DW2 cannot be placed as from a perusal of his report Ext. B2, it is evident that barring the signature on a written statement in a prior suit, all other admitted signaturesof the first defendant are of a period subsequent to the filing of the plaint (i.e. on the vakalatnama and the written statement filed in this suit itself). It was held that these admitted signatures taken subsequent to the filing of the suit could not have been used as a valid basis of comparison, and their use for this purpose casts serious doubt on the reliability of the entire report Ext. B2. Thus, the report was liable to be discarded on this ground alone,and was wrongly relied upon by the High Court.
The SC holds that the High Court has wrongly observed that the plaintiff has not produced any evidence to prove that he demanded the performance of sale after the execution of the agreement of sale. It was held that the filing of a suit for specific performance of an agreement of sale is governed by Section 16(c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963, read with Article 54 of the Schedule of the Limitation Act, 1963. In addition to this, Forms 47 and48 of Appendix A of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 prescribe the format of the plaint for such a suit. Thus, a plaint which seeks the relief of specific performance of an agreement/contract must comply with all these requirements. It was held, in the matter at hand, the plaintiff has specifically averred in his plaint that he was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract under the agreement of sale dated 20.04.1993. It was also specifically stated that the plaintiff had been demanding that the first defendant receive the balance consideration of Rs. 58,800/ and execute a regular registered sale deed at his cost, but the first defendant had been avoiding the specific performance of the agreement of sale. In light of this, the SC observed that, all the formalities which are to be pleaded and proved by the plaintiff for getting a decree of specific performance have been fulfilled.
Lastly, it was held that there cannot be any proof of oral demand. The SC was satisfied from the evidence that the plaintiff had sufficient money to pay the balance consideration to the first defendant and was ready and willing to perform his part of the contract. Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court was restored.